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Marital splits may aﬀect the economic well-being of families with
children signiﬁcantly. We study the economic eﬀects of divorce in such
families in Norway, using administrative information on more than
60,000 individuals. In the typical case, where the mother has custody,
the mother (and child) lacks behind before maintenance payments,
but after adding these, the outcomes at the median are very similar.
However, the median pre-post divorce income reduction is larger for
custodial women than for non-custodial men, they have larger risks of
an income drop, and larger probabilities of an aggravated position in
the income distribution. We also supplement the measures of realized
net incomes with an estimate of earnings capabilities. Though not af-
fecting the ranking of the diﬀerent groups, these calculations indicate
that measures based on realized incomes may underrate the well-being
of individuals who do not work full-time. The analysis also includes a
sensitivity analysis of important parameters in the equivalence scales.
An important feature of the Norwegian ”post-divorce package” is that
the Government guarantees a minimum level for, and enforces, mainte-
nance payments from the non-custodian to the custodian parent. The
system emerges from our analysis as having an equalizing eﬀect on the
economic costs of divorce.
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11 Introduction
Divorce rates have been on the rise across the developed world for several
years: in 1970 the OECD average number of divorces per 100 marriages
was 14.3, in 1998 it had increased to 41.2. Marital break-ups may seriously
aﬀect the living conditions of those involved, in particular in families with
children. Over the last couple of decades this fact has spurred research in
the social sciences on the economic consequences of divorce, in particular on
gender diﬀerences, and also on comparing the net eﬀects of diﬀerent types
of social insurance and welfare programs across countries. This paper adds
to the received literature with a study of the income eﬀects of divorce in
Norway, a country characterized by a high degree of female labour force
participation, a quite extensive post-divorce income package for divorcees
with child custody, and high divorce rates. Focussing on the interplay of
gender and child custody, we use an equivalence scale that takes into account
the time spent by non-custodians with their children. We also suggest an
alternative measure of economic well-being based on earnings capacity rather
than realized earnings.
Grossly speaking, the main ﬁnding of previous research is that wives ex-
perience serious post-divorce income drops, whereas the eﬀects of a split are
less dramatic for their ex-husbands. Burkhauser et al. (1990, 1991) com-
pare the United States to Germany, using data from respectively the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics and the German Socio-Economic Panel. They
ﬁnd that women and children are worse oﬀ than men in both countries, and
that the inequalities in Germany following a divorce are at least as great
as in the US, despite the more extensive social welfare system in Germany.
Jarvis and Jenkins (1999), using the British Household Panel Survey ﬁnd
that ”although the tax-transfer system mitigates the diﬀerentials in out-
comes between husbands, on the one hand, and wives and children on the
other, signiﬁcant diﬀerentials remain.” In another US study, Bianchi et al.
(1999), using data from the late 1980s and early 1990s (the Survey of Income
and Program Participation), ﬁnd that wives who retain custody of children
after separation have needs adjusted income levels at about 56% of their
former husbands. Other studies suggesting diﬀerent post-divorce outcomes
for men and women include Duncan and Hoﬀman (1985) for the US, and
Finnie (1993) for Canada.
Norway, the subject of this study, had an estimated number of divorces
per 100 marriages of 46.8 in 2000, above the OECD 1998 average of 41.2
and Denmark’s 37, but below Finland (57) and Sweden (65).1Like the other
1Sources: OECD, Society at a glance 2001, Underlying data, Annex G: General context
indicators, http://www.oecd.org, and Statistics Norway, http://www.ssb.no. In 1998 the
Norwegian number was at the OECD average, but 1980-95 it was above. The number of
divorces per 100 marriages for a given year is the percentage of divorces that would result
during 60 years of marriage at the current divorce rates.
2Scandinavian countries, Norway is characterized by a low degree of economic
inequality (Atkinson et al. 1995; Aaberge et al., 2000). Social insurance
and beneﬁts are generally generous. Like in many other European coun-
tries, there are general child allowances that are not means tested. After
divorces, custodians are supported by cash allowances as well as tax deduc-
tions. Moreover, child support is enforced by the public authorities: the
minimum level of allowances is law-regulated, and in absence of payment,
the government pays the minimum allowance to the custodian parent and
takes reponsibility for collecting the debt from the other party. This feature
makes the Norwegian system stand out, though it in other respects bears
close resemblances to the post-divorce policies of other European countries.
The present analysis utilizes data on more than 60,000 individuals, drawn
from a large longitudinal database constructed by combining information
from several public registers.
The common measures of economic well-being are based on realized in-
comes and transfers, and we follow the same approach. However, it may
be seen as a weakness with such measures that the value of household pro-
duction in eﬀect is set to zero. We therefore supplement the analysis by
drawing on Haveman and Bershadker (1998, 2001) who suggest using earn-
ings capacity, deﬁned as the earnings a household could obtain if all its
adult members were working full time in the labour market, when measur-
ing poverty. Their idea is that the most needy are those who are uncapable
of generating a minimum income. Even though the focus in this paper is not
on poverty, we ﬁnd the earnings capacity concept relevant in our context,
too, as an objective of the public policy towards divorced families is to avoid
unfavourable outcomes for the party with the largest needs. Furthermore,
using earnings capacity may be interpreted as placing an implicit value of
unpaid child care and other unpaid work in the household, thus reﬂecting a
family’s maximum consumption possibilities.
A substantial part of the analysis to come is to assess the eﬀect of welfare
state interventions by comparing pre- and post-transfers incomes. These
comparisons are only suggestive: in absence of governmental interventions
families and individuals might have chosen other alternatives with respect
to labour force participation as well as marital status. Furthermore, the
probability of obtaining child custody may be endogenous to the probability
of divorce. A full analysis of the distributional eﬀects of the transfers system,
with endogenous divorce and custody probabilities, is outside our scope in
this paper — as in the received literature quoted above.2
The paper now proceeds with an assessment of the applied methods.
The third section describes the data and gives more institutional details,
2For analyses of the eﬀects of expected income and transfers on divorce, see, e.g.,
Johnson and Skinner (1986), Moﬃtt (1990), Hoﬀman and Duncan (1995), Nixon (1997),
Tjøtta and Vaage (2002).
3followed by a section containing results and a discussion, and ﬁn a l l yb ya
section with some concluding remarks.
2M e t h o d
The aim of the analysis is to assess the distributional eﬀects of divorce on
couples with children. We focus on the eﬀects of the total tax and transfer
system by computing and comparing several income measures:
A Post-tax earnings before any child-related transfers;
B Post-tax earnings + ordinary child allowances;
C Post-tax earnings + ordinary child allowances + extra advantages for
custodial parents;
D Post-tax earnings + ordinary child allowances + extra advantages for
custodial parents + child support from the non-custodial to the cus-
todial parent.
Thus we get an impression of the ”general eﬀect” of the welfare state (B)
and the eﬀects of measures directed especially towards divorced families (C,
D). Our income measures C and D are comparable to those used by Jarvis
and Jenkins (1999), whereas Burkhauser et al. (1990, 1991) use post-transfer
pre-tax incomes.
We ﬁrst perform these computations for divorced and intact families,
using gross taxable earnings as inputs. The outcomes are then compared
by gender, and marital and custody status. We also compare pre- and
post divorce status, summarized by transitions to and from a low income
group, and by percentage income change. Finally, the analysis is extended
by computing and comparing A-D based on estimated earnings capacities.
2.1 Estimating earnings capacity
The full, or potential, income of an individual is the income that could be
earned by working full time in the labour market (Becker, 1965). We model
the expected potential income (in logs) of individual i as
E(Y ∗
i |Xi)=β0Xi, (1)
where Xi denotes human capital and β is a vector of coeﬃcients. The
asterisk indicates the fact that full income is only observed for individuals
who work full time. With an estimate of β in hand, however, we may obtain
an estimate of E(Y ∗
i |Xi).
4Letting Yi denote the log income of an individual who actually works
full-time, and D∗
i the propensity of working full-time, we can model this as
a standard sample selection process:
Y ∗
i = β0Xi + ²i (2)
D∗
i = γ0Zi + ui (3)
Di =1 ( D∗
i > 0) (4)
Yi = Y ∗
i iﬀ Di =1 , unobserved otherwise. (5)
The vector Zi contains Xi (education, experience, and experience squared)
in addition to variables that are assumed to aﬀect the decision to work full
time, but not income once the decision is made. ²i and ui are random error
terms.
The equation system (2) - (5) is estimated by Heckman’s (1979) two-step
estimator. We then follow Haveman and Bershadker (1998, 2001) in adding a
random component to the predicted income to account for earnings variation
that is not explained by the model. Thus the evaluation of the eﬀects of
public transfers for those who work less than full time is based on
e Yi = b Yi + ηi, (6)
where b Yi is estimated potential outcome and ηi is a pseudo-random draw
from the normal distribution with mean zero and variance equal to the
estimated variance in the income equation. For those who actually work full
t i m e ,w eu s et h eo b s e r v e dYi.
The potential earnings of a family is simply the sum of the potential
earnings of its individual (adult) members. We do not take into account
income that might come from children above 18 still living with their parents.
2.2 Family income and equivalence scales
To make incomes comparable for households with diﬀerent numbers of mem-
bers, we use a parametric equivalence scale where household income is di-
vided by
E =( A + τwC)
θ , (7)
where A denotes the number of adults in the household (2 if married, 1 if
divorced), and C denotes the number of children. w i saw e i g h tt h a ta l l o w s
child expenditures to be lower than expenditures for adults. We also take
into account that the children of divorced couples spend some time with
the parent without custody, by using the additional weight τ,w h e r eτ =1
for those still married, τ = τcust for divorced individuals with custody, and
τ = τnoncust =1− τcust for divorced individuals without custody. θ ∈ [0,1]
is meant to catch economies of scale. The closer to 0 θ is, the larger the
economies of scale; oppositely, θ =1indicates absence of scale economies.
5There is no universally agreed-upon equivalence scale, cf. the discussions
in Burkhauser et al. (1990) and Jarvis and Jenkins (1999), and the more
general discussion in Jenkins and Cowell (1994). The scale deﬁned by (7) is
a variety of the one suggested by Buhmann et al. (1988), modiﬁed by the
parameters w and τ. Our default choices of w (0.75) and θ (0.5) are the same
as in a Norwegian governmental report on transfers to families with children
(NOU 1996:3). θ =0 .5 (the ”square root scale”) is also commonly used in
international studies. The parameter τ, to our knowledge, is a novelty of
this study. Attributing some weight to children also for divorced individuals
without custody contrasts to an approach where all weight is given to the
parent with custody, which makes the custodian seem worse oﬀ and the
non-custodian better oﬀ. This change would be larger for the non-custodian
because of the economies of scale parameter. In the analysis we base our
choice of τ on a survey by Statistics Norway (1996) where it was found that
on average, children in divorced families spent 26% of the time with the non-
custodian parent on a yearly basis.3 A st h ec h o i c eo fτ may be important
for the results, we perform a sensitivity analysis for this parameter. We also
carry out sensitivity checks for θ.
3 Data and institutional details
Our data are drawn from a longitudinal database (”KIRUT”) which links
individual level information from several Norwegian public registers. A 10%
random sample of the population aged 16-67 is followed. The database
covers the period 1989-1996. Records are at the individual (not household)
level, but spouses’ income and year of birth may be identiﬁed. KIRUT does
not include survey information. For the present study, the inclusion criteria
are that the individual was married in 1989 and did not re-marry during the
observation period, and that women in the sample were below the age of 40
in 1989. For men, the corresponding age criterion is that the spouse should
be below 40 in 1989. The age restriction is due to our focus on couples with
children.
After exclusions due to missing variables, our sample consists of 31,205
women and 31,107 men. For each year until 1994, the sample is checked for
marital status. ”Parents” are deﬁned as individuals (married or divorced)
with children under the age of 18 in 1994, 26,722 women and 26,658 men.
Among those, 2,576 women and 2,481 men were divorced in 1994, when the
income comparisons are made. We may identify custody status because in
the data, divorced individuals without custody are recorded as not having
children. By comparing post- and pre-divorce child status we thus indirectly
may infer status with respect to custody. The available income information
3Parents with custody report somewhat less (23.2%), parents without custody some-
what more (28.0%) - on average 25.6%.
6is gross taxable own earnings and spouse earnings. As noted in the previous
section, we apply the tax rules on these earnings, and add general child
beneﬁts and extra beneﬁts for custodian divorcees where applicable. Finally,
child support from the custodian is added/subtracted. Means-tested social
assistance is not taken into account, as only a binary indicator was available
in the data. Compared to survey-based studies, we rely somewhat more
on imputed transfers. On the other hand, our income data are obtained
from the tax registers and, in principle, should be void of measurement
problems (unless the tax reports themselves have been subject to evasions).
Moreover, for a country with only about 4.5 mill. inhabitants, the sample
is large compared to other studies.
The full sample is used when estimating the income equations for the po-
tential income analysis, but only parents are used in the income comparisons
that make up the main bulk of this study. A ”full-time worker” is deﬁned as
having yearly earnings above NOK 150,000 (women) and 165,000 (men).4
It follows from the construction of the database that about 10% of the in-
dividuals in the sample are married to each other, but we cannot identify
who is married to (or divorced from) whom. The available spouse informa-
tion is age and gross earnings; the earnings information is also available for
ex-spouses.
(Table 1 about here)
Table 1 shows some background characteristics by marital status and
gender. It follows from the sampling selection criteria that the average
age of the female sample is about the same as the average spouses’s age
in the male sample. We further note that the average education of men is
slightly higher than for women, and that the average education of those who
divorce is lower than for those who stay married. As one would expect, the
earnings of women in 1989 was lower than for men. It is also notable that
a larger fraction were social assistance receivers in 1989 among those who
later divorced than those who did not, and that this fraction had increased
signiﬁcantly by 1994.
The Norwegian law on child custody settles one of the parents as custo-
dian and the other as non-custodian. Until recently (including the period
covered in our data), joint custody is ruled out as an outcome from a judi-
cial conﬂict, and only observed if parents agree upon it. Choice of custodian
should be guided by what is in the best interest of the children. Obviously,
in most cases that judgement is hard to make for a third party. The law
therefore also takes into account observables such as earnings capacity, and
which parent spends most time at home.
The main features of the child support and maintenance payments sys-
4We had to base the ”full-time” deﬁnition on earnings due to lack of reliable hours in-
formation. The chosen limits approximately correspond to the average earnings of hospital
orderlies (men) and unskilled nursery workers (women).
7tem are as follows. Ordinary child beneﬁts for children under the age of 18
are paid to all parents. In addition, divorced families get beneﬁts for one
extra child. In married families, the beneﬁts are paid to the mother, in di-
vorced families to the custodial parent.T h ec u s t o d i a na l s og e t sa ne x t r at a x
deduction and cash beneﬁts to cover child care.5 Child support from the non-
custodian to the custodian is negotiated privately based on the non-custodial
parent’s income, but enforced and guaranteed by the public authorities. In
90% of the cases the standard (minimum) rate is applied: 11% of gross in-
come for one child, 18% for two, 24% for three, and a maximum of 28% for
four children or more.6 The paid/received amount is deductable/taxable.
According to the Ministry of Children and Family Aﬀairs, about 85% of
the non-custodians pay the agreed-upon child support regularly. The pub-
lic enforcement (with prepayment and subsequent debt collection in case
of initial non-payment) of the private agreement between the parents is a
quite special feature of the Norwegian system. Recently (2001), a reform
of the system has been planned to promote ”fairness”: in the future, the
earnings of both parents, along with actual child related costs, will be taken
into account when calculating the support level. Interestingly, in the UK,
The Child Support Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 takes steps in the
opposite direction, from a cost based to an income based system.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Results based on realized incomes
(Table 2 about here)
Table 2 shows diﬀe r e n te q i v a l e n c es c a l e di n c o m em e a s u r e si n1 9 9 4b y
gender and family status. The last line shows ”raw” individual pre-tax
earnings. Recall that all individuals are married and with children at the
outset, but the men and women are not (necessarily) married to one another,
due to the construction of the database. When computing equivalence scaled
incomes, the ”burden” of divorced couples’ children is split between the
parents according to custody status and the parameter τ, as discussed in
section 2.2.
5Lone parents who undertake education are eligible for extra beneﬁts, but we do not
have information on the receipt of those.
6The authorities guarantee a minimum amount of support per year (NOK 11,760 in
1994). If the non-custodian’s income is insuﬃcient to provide the minimum amount by
applying the standard rate, the diﬀerence is paid by the government. In these cases the
support payments are decided discretionally, typically below the standard rate, with zero
payments for those with very low incomes. In our calculations, we have approximated
this practice by adjusting the standard rate (q) as follows. Let a denote the minimum
amount and m = a/q. For non-custodian income (y)l e s st h a n0.5m, we set payments to
0. For 0.5m ≤ y<m , we adjust the rate to q(y − 0.5m)/0.5m. The received support is
calculated as max(a,qy).
8We note that the household incomes for married men and women are
quite similar, indicating that using individual data to assess household en-
tities gives a fairly good approximation. As expected, Table 2 shows that
divorced households are worse oﬀ than those that stay married. Pre-tax
earnings (the last line) are lower than for married individuals of the same
gender (except divorced women without custody, whose earnings are slightly
higher than for married women). The post-tax, pre-transfers measure (In-
come A) shows that the burden is typically worsened by the loss of the
spouse’s income, in particular for women. The gradual adding of child re-
lated transfers (Income B and C) shows that without these transfers, women
with custody would be worst oﬀ in terms of equivalence income. Standard
child beneﬁts are not enough to equalize women with custody to those with-
out. After adding extra advantages for custodians, women with custody
are better oﬀ than women without, but still their median income is below
the median of men without custody. The net result after including mainte-
nance payments (Income D), however, is that women without custody are
clearly worst oﬀ, even though their pre-tax earnings are higher than those
of married women. Now, the median equivalence incomes of women with
custody and men without are almost identical, indicating a fairly successful
re-distribution. The 10th and 90th centiles reveals a larger income disper-
sion for men, however. The situation for women without custody is not so
good, with median net income at 74% of the median for women with cus-
tody. The fact that the 10th percentile for this group is estimated to 0 must
be seen in connection with social welfare payments not being included — as
seen in Table 1, 16.7% of non-custodial women receive means tested social
assistance.
(Table 3 and 4 about here)
Tables 3 and 4 describe income dynamics associated with marital splits.
Table 3 shows transitions during 1989-1994 into and out of a low income
group deﬁned as earning less in terms of equivalized net income than the
minimum social security beneﬁt (NOK 51,174 for a single person in 1989,
NOK 60,700 in 1994).7 The 1989 incomes have been computed applying
the same equivalence scales as for 1994. Clearly, the inﬂow to low income
is lowest for those who stay married. For women who experience a marital
split, but retain custody, the inﬂow is quite large (20.8%), but the rate is
even higher for women without custody (27.5%). For men, inﬂow is lower.
It deserves to be mentioned that the inﬂow to low-income is lower for non-
custodial men than for custodial women, even though the 1994 net income
10th centile of the men is lower. The explanation must be that a larger
fraction of low-income women have lost the income of an ex-spouse; whereas
7For countries without an oﬃcial poverty threshold, half of the median income is often
used as a ”poverty line”. We have chosen the politically decided minimum pension partly
because it gives an idea of what is oﬃcially accepted as a minimum, but also because the
median income in our selected sample would not be representative for the population.
9low-income men to a larger extent have had low-income spouses.
The upper panel of Table 4 shows percentage net income changes. Again
we ﬁnd that the outcomes of women with custody are quite similar to men
without, but still slightly worse: the median woman who experiences a mar-
ital split and retains custody has a 4.1% income drop, whereas non-custodial
men drops 0.7% at the median. Women without custody drops as much as
31.9% at the median, and even at the 75th percentile the drop is 16.3%. Men
with custody have the most favourable development of all (including those
who stay married), with 8.8% income increase at the 25th centile, and 36.4%
at the median. In the lower panel we have summed up changes in relative
position when the income distribution is split into deciles. Clearly, there
is a higher tendency to move down for divorcees, in particular for women
without custody. This group also has the lowest probability of moving up
the income ladder. Furthermore, the risk of a downward movement is larger
for women with custody (66.1%) than for men without (58.4%). Men with
custody have a more than 50% probability of improving their position in the
income distribution, not too surprising considering the results in the top of
the table.
4.1.1 Sensitivity analysis
In the sensitivity analysis we have focussed on the parameters τ (weighting
of children according to custody) and θ (economies of scale), concentrating
on the income measures in Table 2 labelled A (post-tax earnings before
child related transfers), and D (post-tax earnings plus public and private
transfers). Our primary focus is on the latter, but the pre-transfers measure
(A) is also of interest, as the diﬀerence shows the impact of positive and
negative child related transfers.
(Figures 1 and 2 about here)
Figure 1 shows the eﬀect on median incomes of women with, and men
without custody of letting τnoncust vary, keeping θ constant at the default
value 0.5. Recall from Table 2 that the median net income (Income D) of
these groups are almost identical. We see that this result is quite dependent
on τnoncust. If non-custodian men spend less time with their children than
assumed in our calculations, the picture of the economic outcome is changed
in their ex-spouses’ disfavour. Furthermore, there are no values for τnoncust
that equalize men and women before transfers (Income A). Figure 2 shows
the eﬀects on the ”opposite” constellation, men with and women without
custody. Here, τnoncust has no eﬀect on the ranking of men and women in
terms of the net result (D). The result that men are better oﬀ in terms of
pre-transfers income holds for τnoncust > 0.125.
(Figures 3 and 4 about here.)
Figures 3 and 4 show a similar exercise for the economies of scale pa-
rameter θ, keeping τnoncust at 0.26. We ﬁnd that this parameter, too, is
10critical for the ranking of women with and men without custody. For val-
ues of θ indicating less economies of scale (closer to 1) than assumed in the
present analysis, the economic well-being of men without custody (Figure
3) apparently is better. Figure 4 shows that, again, the ranking of net in-
c o m e si sn o ta ﬀected by the parameter value when the man has custody -
the median woman is always worse oﬀ. For this constellation, the ranking
of pre-transfer incomes is reversed for θ > 0.775.
4.2 Results based on potential incomes
We now turn to comparisons based on potential incomes.8 As discussed
in section 2.1, these are the household incomes that would be obtained if
the parents worked full time, adjusted by the same equivalence scale as
in the previous section. The results may be interpreted either as earnings
capacities, or, alternatively, as placing a value, namely the market wage,
on household production. Thus we may supplement our picture of diﬀerent
family types’ consumption possibilities.
(Table 5 about here)
Table 5 shows the same equivalence scaled income measures as Table 2,
but based on potential earnings. The unscaled pre-tax measure in the last
line shows lower mean earnings capacity for women than for men. Subtract-
ing taxes and running the result through the equivalence scale shows that
before child-related transfers, women with custody are worse oﬀ than men
without. When the roles are reversed, the ”Income A” measure is almost
equal for custodians and non-custodians, however. Adding child allowances
and extra advantages improve the relative standing of parents with custody,
and the ﬁnal result (Income D) is that the ranking of female custodians
and male non-custodians is reversed. This is due to transfers between the
ex-spouses, however: when only child allowances and special advantages
are included, the median income of divorced female custodians is still NOK
13,000 (9%) below their male counterpart’s without custody. It should be
noted that according to the potential income measure, female custodians
are better oﬀ relatively to male non-custodians than when comparisons are
based on realized incomes.
(Figures 5-8 about here)
We have performed the same sensitivity analysis on the equivalence scale
parameters as for realized incomes, illustrated in Figure 5-8. In the previous
paragraph we found that the end-result was that women with custody earn
more than men without. Figure 5 shows that this is fairly robust to smaller
values of τnoncust — the ranking of median potential incomes changes only
8The estimated earnings equations are reported in the appendix. All 31,205 women and
31,107 men (including those not deﬁned as parents in 1994) were used in the estimations.
For spouses, the potential income is based on average predictions grouped by age in 5-year
intervals, as we have information on spouses’ age but not their education and experience.
11for values smaller than 0.1. Men with custody, on the other hand, are better
oﬀ than women without for all values of τ, as seen from Figure 6. What
regards economies of scale, Figure 7 indicates that only when quite small
economies of scale are assumed (θ > 0.875), the median net income of female
custodians becomes smaller than for male non-custodians. Figure 8 shows
that, again, the net income ranking of female non-custodians below male
custodians is not aﬀected by the value of θ.
4.3 Discussion
The primary aim of the Norwegian system of post-divorce transfers is to
secure the economic well-being of children in divorced families, using public
as well as private transfers. An important feature of the system is the public
enforcement of private transfers within the divorced families. To the extent
that the welfare of the child is synonymous with the welfare of the parent
with custody, the policy is largely successful. In the typical situation, where
the mother obtains custody, the median equivalence scaled net income is
a 14% improvement from the post-tax income before extra advantages for
custodians. For the minority who lives with the father, this is even more the
case: after scaling, the net incomes in these households are at the same level
as in complete families. This comes at the expense of the parent without
custody, however, and in particular if this parent is a woman. The median
net income of a woman without custody is only 56% of the equivalent income
in a complete family. Consequently, the children in these families spend some
of their time with a parent with seemingly severe economic diﬃculties.
It cannot be claimed that the economic consequences of divorce are to-
tally equalized between men and women (assuming that the woman has
custody). The median income change is more negative for custodial women
than for non-custodial men, they have larger risks (54.4 vs. 51.3%) of an
income drop, and also larger probabilities of an aggravated position in the
income distribution (66.1 vs. 58.4%). None the less, these diﬀerences seem
less dramatic, in particular when compared to intact families, where the risk
of an income drop is less than 25%.
The potential income measures give an upward adjustment of the con-
sumption possibilities for all groups, without changing their relative rankings
in terms of net incomes. Women with custody at the median have about
80% of the equivalent income of intact families, slightly more than when
looking at realized incomes. On the other hand, the ratio of the potential
income of the ”untypical” men with custody to the income of married fam-
ilies is reduced. We interpret this reduction as reﬂecting the larger value of
household production in intact families. In the typical divorced family, the
ex-husband is the loser, with about 69% of the median income of married
families, and 86% of the income of divorced women with custody. These
percentages are reductions compared to those based on realized incomes,
12reﬂecting that women have larger unused earnings capacities, whether they
are married or divorced. One way to interpret the analysis involving poten-
tial income is that measures based on realized incomes somewhat underrate
the economic well-being of individuals who do not work full-time. Because
women are over-represented among those, the relative standing of custodial
women and married couples are improved in comparisons based on potential
income.
One should bear in mind that the results are dependent on the parame-
ter measuring the time children spend with the parent without custody. If
the true value is lower than assumed (26%), the economic situation of custo-
dian mothers is worse than for non-custodial fathers, measured by realized
incomes. Thus our results may be too optimistic regarding these women.
On the other hand, this sensitivity gives an important insight, as the usual
approach when using equivalence scales to compare divorcees is to give no
weight to the child for the non-custodian, thereby by necessity making the
custodian seem worse oﬀ. But it is also clear that the outcome is harsh for
women without custody, regardless of the equivalence scale parameters.
Compared to the studies quoted in the introduction, the gender diﬀer-
ences found here (again, assuming that the wife obtains custody) are less
dramatic. This may be due to diﬀerent data and methods: we base our
results on calculated transfers, whereas the survey-based studies use reports
of actual transfers. We also have a longer observation period than the other
studies. The sensitivity analysis has shown that the assumption that there is
a cost associated with children also for divorcees without custody, is critical.
Still we think the results reﬂect system diﬀerences. In particular, we have
seen that the child support, guaranteed by the government, has the eﬀect of
almost bringing custodial women a par with non-custodial men. Some cau-
tion must be exerted: as noted in section 3, 85% of the non-custodians pay
support regularly, implying that 15% do not. In these cases, our measure
of net income (Income D) under-estimates the economic well-being of non-
custodians. This may be reﬂected by the larger number of custodial women
than non-custodial men being social assistance receivers, as seen from Ta-
ble 1. Jarvis and Jenkins (1999) in their main calculations do not deduct
fathers’ maintenance payments, but in a sensitivity analysis they ﬁnd that
this is of less importance for the results. The explanation is that few liable
non-custodial parents actually pay support, and the amounts paid are not
large. In the present analysis we found that maintenance payments play
a crucial part in equalizing the burdens of divorce — recall from Section 3
that in the Norwegian system the payments are sizeable, at least 11% of the
non-custodian’s gross income. Combined with the fact that a majority do
pay, we believe that the results in Tables 2-4 reﬂect the main situation.
There are some additional caveats. We have not been able to include
social assistance beneﬁts, thus the full impact of the welfare state is not
reﬂected in our net income measure, and the actual end-result in the lower
13end of the distribution may be better than our results suggest. Neither do
we have access to ﬁnancial wealth and income, housing wealth and expendi-
tures. In the earnings capacities calculations, it may be argued that because
childcare expenses are not included, the potential incomes of persons with
and without child custody are diﬃcult to compare. Another problem is that
we have no information about cohabitation and cannot rule out that some
divorcees have co-habitants, thereby possibly improving their economic posi-
tion. For the same reason, the eﬀects of breaking up cohabitating unions are
not addressed. However, we do not ﬁnd it probable that these shortcomings
have altered the main conclusions.
An interesting question is whether the Norwegian post-divorce transfer
system actually induces divorces. Our results show that the combination of
private and public transfers and tax deductions dramatically improve the
economic performance of divorced parents with child custody. It is tempt-
ing to conclude that the system has two side eﬀects: First, it stimulates
marital break-up by reducing the associated economic risk for the custodial
part, and second, it stimulates conﬂicts over child custody due to the detri-
mental eﬀects on the non-custodial party, if she is a woman. To draw such
conclusions, however, a simultaneous analysis of divorce decisions, custody
probability, and labour market participation would be necessary.
5 Concluding remarks
A marital split may reduce the level of economic well-being of the family
signiﬁcantly, especially for couples with children. In this paper we have
studied the economic eﬀects of divorce in such families in Norway, taking
into account the full ”post-divorce package”, which includes special transfers
to the custodial part, as well as a governmental guarantee for the level and
payment of child support from the non-custodian. We ﬁnd that in the
typical case, where the mother has custody, the mother (and child) lacks
behind before maintenance payments, but after adding these, the outcomes
at the median are very similar, and to a greater extent than in previous
ﬁndings from the UK, US, and Germany. This is not true, however, for
non-custodian mothers, who have only 56% of the equivalized income in an
intact family at the median. The optimistic result for custodial mothers
is modiﬁed by the ﬁnding that the median income reduction is larger than
for non-custodial men, they have larger risks of an income drop, and larger
probabilities of an aggravated position in the income distribution.
We also supplement the measures of realized net incomes with an es-
timate of earnings capabilities. This does not aﬀect the ranking of the
diﬀerent groups, but the standing of custodial women and married couples
are improved. The reason is that women have larger unused earnings ca-
pacities, whether they are married or divorced. Thus measures based on
14realized incomes may underrate the well-being of individuals who do not
work full-time.
As is common, we use equivalence scales to compare incomes of house-
holds of diﬀerent sizes. We depart from similar studies by assuming (based
on survey information) that the non-custodial parent spend some time with
the child(ren), and adjust the equivalence scale accordingly. A sensitivity
analysis shows that this assumption is critical for the result that the median
net incomes of custodial mothers and non-custodial fathers are almost equal.
Therefore, this optimistic conclusion should be interpreted with some care.
On the other hand, the ﬁnding also indicates that similar studies, which
do not make this adjustment in the equivalence scale, may under-rate the
well-being of custodians relatively to non-custodians.
The Norwegian system emerges from the analysis looking fairly successful
in equalizing the economic costs of divorce. At the same time the expected
number of divorces per 100 marriages in Norway is almost at the upper quar-
tile among the OECD countries. One may ask if there is a causal connection
between these two statements, however any conclusion is unwarranted here,
as the analysis has taken the divorce probabilities as exogenous.
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17Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 Women  Men 
  Full sample  Parents by marital status 1994  Full sample  Parents by marital status 1994 








 Mean  SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Education  1989 11.2 2.2  11.4 2.2 10.9 2.0 10.7 2.1 11.6 2.6 11.8 2.6 11.4 2.5 11.1 2.3 
Education  1994 11.4 2.3  11.6 2.3 11.3 2.2 10.8 2.3 11.8 2.7 12.0 2.7 11.6 2.6 11.3 2.3 
Experience  1989 8.5 4.9 8.4 4.7 7.5 4.6 8.4 4.9 14.5 5.3 14.1 5.1 14.7 4.8 13.8 5.5 
Experience  1994  12.4 5.7  12.2 5.6 11.1 5.6 12.5 5.8 19.3 5.4 18.9 5.2 19.4 4.8 18.4 5.7 
Age  1989  32.4 5.1  32.0 4.9 30.4 5.0 34.1 4.7 35.3 5.9 34.8 5.6 35.4 5.5 34.4 6.3 
Spouse’s age 
1989  35.4 5.9  34.8 5.6 33.6 5.8 37.3 5.7 32.4 5.0 32.0 4.8 31.6 4.7 31.2 5.3 
Children <18, 
1989  1.8 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.8 0.9 1.8 0.8 1.8 1.0 1.9 1.0 2.1 0.9 1.8 0.9 
Children <18, 
1994  1.8 1.1 2.1 0.9 1.9 0.8 1.7 0.7 1.8 1.1 2.1 0.9 2.1 0.8 1.9 0.8 
Gross earnings 
1989  95 72 91 72 87 70 99 80 226 106 229  105 229 105 207 103 
Spouse’s gross 
earnings 1989  222 131 225 110 204 109 223 133 92 75 88  75 87 70 88 72 
Spouse’s gross 
earnings  1994  237 254 268 267 - - - - 113 122 123 127 - - - - 
Social assistance 
receiver  1989  1.3% 0.9% 4.8% 2.4% 2.1% 1.8% 4.3% 5.4% 
Social assistance 
receiver 1994  2.3% 0.5%  18.6%  16.7%  2.5% 1.6% 6.8%  10.8% 
          
N  31205 24146  2038  538  31107 24177  600  1881 
Notes:  Education measured in years 
Experience: years with income above basic counting unit in social insurance system 
Earnings and spouse’s earnings in 1000s 1994 NOKTable 2 Effects of transfers on equivalence scaled 1994 household incomes. 1000 NOK 










Income A Mean 142 61 85 142 110 128
10
th centile  79 0 0 78 37 22
50
th centile  139 66 97 139 110 132
90
th centile  204 115 146 205 175 198
Income B Mean 154 75 85 153 125 128
10
th centile  93 14 0 91 53 22
50
th centile  150 80 97 150 125 132
90
th centile  214 127 146 214 187 198
Income C Mean 154 94 85 153 147 129
10
th centile  93 30 0 91 73 24
50
th centile  150 100 97 150 146 132
90
th centile  214 149 146 214 211 198
Income D Mean 154 109 77 153 159 114
10
th centile  93 44 0 91 88 22
50
th centile  150 115 85 150 160 116
90
th centile  214 164 129 214 222 177
 
Pre-tax Mean 124 120 137 267 240 225
N   24146 2038 538 24177 600 1881
Income A: Post-tax earnings, no child related transfers                                         
Income B: Post-tax earnings + child benefits 
Income C: Post-tax earnings + child benefits + extra advantages for custodians 
Income D: Post-tax earnings + child benefits + extra advantages for custodians +/- maintenance payments from/to ex-spouse 
Pre-tax: Unscaled earnings (without spouse)  
Table 3 Low-income transitions 1989-94 by marital and custody status 1994 










not custody  
Transitions from non-low income 1989        
NL-NL 96.0%  97.8% 79.2% 72.5% 96.9% 97.7% 94.1% 87.3% 
NL-L 4.0%  2.2% 20.8% 27.5% 3.1% 2.3% 5.9% 12.7% 
Observations 25303  22974 1834 495 25403 23107 571 1725 
Transitions from low income 1989   
L-NL 74.0%  78.1% 60.8% 25.6% 70.7% 73.3% 69.0% 53.2% 
L-L 26.0%  21.9% 39.2% 74.4% 29.3% 26.7% 31.0% 46.8% 
Observations 1419  1172 204 43 1255 1070 29 156 
NL: Equivalence scaled household income ≥  minimum social security benefit for a single person 
L: Equivalence scaled household income < minimum social security benefit for a single person  Table 4 Percentage income change and change in relative position in the income distribution 1989-94, by marital and custody status 1994 










not custody  
Percentage income change    
Lower  quartile 2.6% 6.5% -28.0% -65.1% 4.3% 6.3% 8.8% -27.6% 
Median 22.8% 25.0% -4.1% -31.9% 23.9% 24.8% 36.4% -0.7% 
Upper  quartile 45.7% 47.2% 22.1% -16.3% 46.5% 46.8% 65.4% 29.2% 
      
50+ % drop  3.1  1.8 11.7 32.0  2.9 2.0 4.2 14.3 
10-50%  drop  12.5 10.1 30.8 49.4 11.3 10.2 8.3 26.7 
0-10%  drop  7.2 6.9 11.9 4.8 6.9 6.6 4.3 9.9 
0-10%  increase  10.3 10.4 11.7 3.4 10.4 10.5 9.2 9.8 
10-50%  increase  45.0 48.0 19.8 6.3 46.0 48.0 35.6 24.0 
50+%  increase  21.8 22.9 14.1 4.1 22.5 22.7 38.4 15.3 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
      
Change in relative position (decile) in the income distribution    
Down  38.0 34.7 66.1 80.9 36.2 34.6 31.5 58.4 
Same  23.2 23.9 16.9 13.7 23.8 24.4 15.8 19.2 
Up  38.8 41.4 17.0 5.4 40.0 41.0 52.7 22.4 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Table 5 Effects of transfers on equivalence scaled 1994 estimated household earnings capacities. 1000 NOK 










Income A Mean 176 101 126 181 128 156
10
th centile  136 75 97 139 86 110
50
th centile  173 98 122 174 119 145
90
th centile  221 127 157 227 180 213
Income B Mean 188 115 126 192 142 156
10
th centile  150 92 97 153 104 110
50
th centile  184 112 122 185 134 145
90
th centile  230 139 157 237 190 213
Income C Mean 188 136 126 192 165 156
10
th centile  151 113 97 153 124 110
50
th centile  184 132 122 185 157 145
90
th centile  230 162 157 237 214 213
Income D Mean 188 152 112 192 178 137
10
th centile  150 128 85 153 139 95
50
th centile  184 148 109 185 170 128
90
th centile  230 178 141 237 228 188
 
Pre-tax Mean 206 204 208 293 281 276
N   24146 2038 538 24177 600 1881
Income A: Post-tax earnings, no child related transfers                                         
Income B: Post-tax earnings + child benefits 
Income C: Post-tax earnings + child benefits + extra advantages for custodians 
Income D: Post-tax earnings + child benefits + extra advantages for custodians +/- maintenance payments from/to ex-spouse 
Pre-tax: Unscaled potential earnings capacity (without spouse) Appendix: Earnings equations (2-step estimates) 
 Women Men
  Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
Earnings equation        
Education 0.025 0.001 18.38 0.051 0.001 51.71
Experience 0.002 0.002 0.73 0.037 0.003 14.39
Experience
2/10 0.001 0.001 1.82 -0.008 0.001 -11.81
Selection term  -0.067 0.011 -5.92 0.039 0.015 2.67
Constant 11.901 0.040 300.56 11.500 0.030 379.66
Selection equation        
Education 0.190 0.004 52.13 0.186 0.004 41.79
Experience 0.184 0.007 26.91 0.121 0.010 12.18
Experience
2/10 -0.031 0.002 -12.71 0.005 0.003 1.65
Age -0.019 0.002 -9.64 -0.106 0.003 -37.22
# children < 18  -0.232 0.009 -27.12 0.009 0.009 1.03
Married -0.059 0.054 -1.08 0.097 0.069 1.41
Custody -0.340 0.047 -7.30 0.188 0.035 5.43
Social assistance receiver  -0.886 0.077 -11.53 -1.018 0.053 -19.25
Spouse income/10
4  -0.002 0.001 -3.44 0.006 0.001 4.75
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